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CONFUSING REGULATORY TAKINGS  
WITH REGULATORY EXACTIONS:  
THE SUPREME COURT GETS LOST  
IN THE SWAMP OF KOONTZ 
ISRAEL PIEDRA* 
Abstract: In 2013, the Supreme Court concluded that monetary exactions must 
be considered with the same judicial scrutiny as land exactions. Land exactions 
are required contributions from an individual to a government entity in exchange 
for approval to develop real property. Land exactions proposed by regulatory 
bodies must be roughly proportional and bear a nexus to the development permit 
requested, otherwise the exaction constitutes a taking in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment. In Koontz v. St. Johns River Management District, the Supreme 
Court extended the nexus/rough proportionality test to instances in which gov-
ernment bodies impose monetary conditions on land development. This Com-
ment argues that it was unwise for the Court to apply this strict test to monetary 
exactions. The Court’s holding might create a chilling effect on land use permit-
ting by incentivizing officials to deny development applications to avoid legal 
risk, rather than attempt to impose appropriate mitigation conditions. 
INTRODUCTION 
According to EPA estimates, approximately 60,000 acres of wetlands are 
lost in the United States every year.1 Wetlands are home to thousands of spe-
cies of plants and animals, such as water lilies, turtles, alligators, snakes, and 
migratory birds.2 The depletion of wetlands is a result of many factors, includ-
ing polluted runoff, invasive species, and climate change.3 
A wetland is an area “where water covers the soil, or is present either at or 
near the surface of the soil” for all or most of the year.4 Florida is well-known 
for its plentiful wetlands, most notably the Everglades region in the southern 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2013–2014. 
 1 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WETLANDS OVERVIEW 2 (2004), available at http://water.epa.gov/type/
wetlands/outreach/upload/overview-pr.pdf and http://perma.cc/GD7T-VDQZ. 
 2 Id. 
 3 See id. 
 4 What Are Wetlands?, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/what.cfm (last 
updated Oct. 9, 2012), available at http://perma.cc/67V6-8YK2. 
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portion of the state.5 As of 2010, wetlands comprised about thirty percent of 
the state.6 Until 1972, the laws protecting Florida’s wetlands were based pri-
marily on common law that had developed throughout the previous centuries.7 
From 1970 to 1971, however, the state weathered its worst drought in many 
years, which catalyzed water management reform.8 
In response, the Florida Legislature enacted the Florida Water Resources 
Act of 1972, which “established a form of administrative water law that 
brought all waters of the state under regulatory control.”9 The Act created five 
water management districts, each with a governing board vested with broad 
policymaking power.10 The governing boards regulate water conservation, al-
location, and quality, as well as flood protection, and natural systems manage-
ment.11 
Mitigation proposed by the government was the central controversy in 
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, in which a Florida water 
management district board agreed to approve a development permit if the ap-
plicant contracted to make improvements to public wetlands several miles 
away.12 In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court held that this required offset must be 
roughly proportional, and have a nexus, to the proposed development.13 This 
Comment argues that the Supreme Court impermissibly extended the Nol-
lan/Dolan test to monetary expenditure conditions because the tests were de-
signed for the specific context of real property exactions.14 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Coy Koontz, Sr. purchased an undeveloped tract of land near a highway 
east of Orlando in 1972, the same year that Florida adopted the Water Re-
sources Act.15 The area of the tract was 14.9 acres and was largely classified as 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See ALBERT C. HINE, GEOLOGY OF FLORIDA 17–18 (2009), available at http://www.cengage.
com/custom/enrichment_modules/data/1426628390_Florida-LowRes_watermarked.pdf and http://
perma.cc/9YN8-85MD. 
 6 Karen Greene, Tapping the Last Oasis: Florida-Friendly Landscaping and Homeowners’ Asso-
ciations, 84(5) FLA. B.J. 39, 39 (2010), available at http://goo.gl/4T04KG and http://perma.cc/5PEZ-
SXKC. 
 7 TATIANA BORISOVA & ROY R. CARRIKER, PUBLIC POLICY AND WATER IN FLORIDA 1 (2009), 
available at http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pdffiles/FE/FE79900.pdf and http://perma.cc/S7CD-N8X9. 
 8 ELIZABETH PURDUM, FLORIDA WATERS 10 (2002), available at http://www.swfwmd.state.fl.us/
publications/files/floridawaters.pdf and http://perma.cc/7CM5-64K5. 
 9 BORISOVA & CARRIKER, supra note 7, at 2. 
 10 Id. at 2–3. 
 11 PURDUM, supra note 8, at 10. 
 12 See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2593 (2013). The water 
management district also provided the applicant with the option to reduce the proposed size of the 
project and deed the remaining land to the government. Id. 
 13 See id. at 2603. 
 14 See infra notes 79–112 and accompanying text. 
 15 Id. at 2591–92; see BORISOVA & CARRIKER, supra note 7, at 2. 
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wetlands.16 Commercial developments, residential developments, and road 
construction surrounded the property, and as a result the tract’s value as a wild-
life habitat was severely diminished by the time that Koontz decided to devel-
op.17 
In 1984, the Florida legislature passed the Warren S. Henderson Wetlands 
Protection Act (“Henderson Act”) to safeguard the state’s expansive wet-
lands.18 Under the Henderson Act, prospective developers of wetland property 
must apply for permits from the district’s water management office.19 A suc-
cessful permit application must, among other requirements, provide “reasona-
ble assurances that the project is not contrary to the public interest.”20 The pro-
ject permit may be denied as contrary to the public interest if development will 
adversely affect public health, safety, wildlife conservation, fishing, or naviga-
tion.21 The Henderson Act provides that permit applicants may offset potential 
environmental damage by taking mitigating actions to enhance, restore, or pre-
serve other wetlands in the district.22 Either the applicant or the government 
may supply mitigation proposals.23 
In 1994, Koontz applied to the St. Johns River Management District (“the 
District”) for permits to develop a 3.7-acre portion of his property.24 In an at-
tempt to mitigate the environmental impacts of the project, Koontz offered to 
deed a conservation easement to the District on eleven acres of his property.25 
The District, however, rejected this proposal and instead advanced two alterna-
tive options.26 Under the first option, Koontz could reduce the proposed devel-
opment’s size to one acre and deed the District a conservation easement on the 
remaining 13.9 acres.27 Under the second option, Koontz could proceed with 
                                                                                                                           
 16 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2591–92. 
 17 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (No. 11-1447). 
 18 See Bruce Wiener & David Dagon, Wetlands Regulation and Mitigation After the Florida Envi-
ronmental Reorganization Act of 1993, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 521, 528 (1993). 
 19 Wetland Resource Permitting Program, FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., http://www.
dep.state.fl.us/water/wetlands/erp/wetperm.htm (last updated Sept. 23, 2013), available at http://
perma.cc/EN92-GGP5. Permits are required for any development that includes “dredging, filling and 
construction of structures within the landward extent of wetlands and other surface waters.” Id. 
 20 Id. Other considerations include reasonable assurances that the project will not unacceptably 
degrade water quality, as well as whether a decision to approve or deny a permit will have a cumula-
tive impact on other projects. Id. 
 21 Id. Additional factors considered by a district include whether the proposed project adversely 
affects significant historical resources, causes harmful erosion, or more generally, “[a]dversely af-
fect[s] the . . . relative value of functions performed by the wetlands.” Id. 
 22 Id. Mitigation is approved at the discretion of the district office. Id. Mitigation may not be 
available in cases involving endangered species or “when there is a likelihood that the mitigation will 
not be able to successfully create, restore, or enhance a particular wetland.” Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592. 
 25 Id. at 2592–93. 
 26 Id. at 2593. 
 27 Id. 
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his proposed development of 3.7 acres, deed a conservation easement on the 
rest of the property as originally proposed, and agree to hire contractors to 
make improvements several miles away on District-owned wetlands.28 
In late 1994, Koontz sued under state law, which allows recovery of dam-
ages for agency actions that are unreasonable exercises of state taking power.29 
The litigation continued long after Koontz died in 2000.30 First, the Florida 
trial court dismissed Koontz’s suit on the grounds that the case was not yet ripe 
for adjudication.31 In 1998, the intermediate appellate court reversed, and a 
two-day bench trial resulted on remand.32 
The trial court found that considering Koontz’s offer of an eleven-acre con-
servation easement, the District’s demands for offsite improvements amounted to 
a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.33 The Dis-
trict attempted to appeal the trial court’s decision twice, but the intermediate ap-
pellate court dismissed both appeals and concluded that the trial court’s orders 
were not appealable because the decision below was not a final order.34 
In 2009, the trial court made a final judgment assigning damages to 
Koontz, and the intermediate appellate court affirmed.35 The Florida Supreme 
Court, however, reversed.36 The Florida Supreme Court reasoned that the Dis-
trict denied Koontz’s application for refusing to agree to the mitigations rather 
than approved his application on the condition that he agree to its demands.37 
Furthermore, the court found that because there was a demand for money, ra-
ther than for an actual interest in real property, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Nol-
lan/Dolan test did not apply.38 After the Florida Supreme Court’s adverse deci-
                                                                                                                           
 28 Id. The off-site mitigation involved replacing culverts, plugging ditches, and building a new 
road on “at least 50 acres” of District-owned wetland property. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 
5. The cost of this off-site mitigation could be between $10,000 and $150,000. Transcript of Oral Ar-
gument at 22, Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (No. 11-1447). 
 29 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.617(3)(b) (West 2010); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 7. 
 30 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 2 n.2. Koontz’s estate, represented by his son Coy 
Koontz, Jr., continued the lawsuit. Id. 
 31 St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz (Koontz V), 77 So. 3d 1220, 1223 (Fla. 2011). 
 32 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593; see Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. (Koontz I), 720 
So. 2d 560, 562 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
 33 See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 34 See St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz (Koontz III), 908 So. 2d 518, 518 (Fla. 5th 
Dist. Ct. App. 2005); St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz (Koontz II), 861 So. 2d 1267, 1268 
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003). Although the trial court had assigned liability, it did not assess damages. 
Koontz III, 908 So. 2d at 518. 
 35 St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz (Koontz IV), 5 So. 3d 8, 8–9 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. 
App. 2009). 
 36 Koontz V, 77 So. 3d at 1231. 
 37 See id. (“Nollan and Dolan were not designed to address the situation where a landowner’s 
challenge is based not on excessive exactions but on a denial of development.”). 
 38 See id. 
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sion, Koontz petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which 
the Court granted in 2012.39 
In Koontz, the U.S. Supreme Court in 2013 suggested that the fact that no 
property was actually taken by the District was not determinative.40 In reject-
ing the Florida Supreme Court’s holding, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded 
that because the condition in Koontz so heavily burdened the plaintiff’s proper-
ty, the land-use exaction must be examined under the Nollan/Dolan standards 
to determine whether it was a taking.41 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution re-
quires that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”42 The clause was inspired by the Magna Carta, which prohibit-
ed the taking of land “without some form of due process.”43 In 1897, the U.S. 
Supreme Court used the incorporation doctrine to apply the Takings Clause to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.44 In 1922, the Court decided 
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon and held that excessive government regulation of 
property could amount to a compensable taking.45 
It took more than fifty years before the Court, in Penn Central Transpor-
tation Co. v. New York City, delineated the factors determining when govern-
ment regulations have evolved into a taking.46 These factors are (1) the regula-
tion’s economic impact on the property, (2) the “extent to which the regulation 
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,” and (3) the char-
acter of the government’s action.47 
Later in the twentieth century, the Court articulated a special category of 
property protection in addition to the excessive property regulation that Penn 
Central forbids.48 In the 1987 case Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, a 
couple wished to build a house on their beachfront property.49 The couple re-
quested a coastal development permit from the California Coastal Commis-
                                                                                                                           
 39 Koontz, 133 S. Ct at 2594. 
 40 Id. at 2596. 
 41 Id. at 2596, 2603. 
 42 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 43 Edward J. Sullivan, A Brief History of the Takings Clause, LAND USE LAW, http://
landuselaw.wustl.edu/Articles/Brief_Hx_Taking.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2014), available at http://
perma.cc/Y9QJ-JS9P. 
 44 Id.; see Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). 
 45 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 46 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see Sullivan, supra note 43. 
 47 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
 48 See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2604 (2013) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (explaining the applicability of Nollan and Dolan). 
 49 483 U.S. 825, 827–28 (1987). 
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sion, which would grant the permit only on the condition of a public easement 
grant.50 According to the Commission, the Nollans and the previous property 
owners had previously allowed the public to traverse their property.51 The 
Commission sought to secure this right of way for beachgoers permanently.52 
In declaring the easement condition to be an excessive exaction, the Supreme 
Court held that there must be a “nexus between the condition and the original 
purpose of the building restriction,” otherwise the condition becomes a tak-
ing.53 The Court determined that the purpose of the county’s restriction on 
beachfront development lacked a sufficient nexus to the public access ease-
ment and therefore became a taking.54 
Seven years later, the Court again addressed the takings issue in Dolan v. 
City of Tigard.55 Dolan owned a store on Main Street in Tigard, Oregon, and 
applied to expand her store and pave her parking lot.56 The proposed develop-
ment was within a floodplain, and consequentially the City Planning Commis-
sion agreed to approve Dolan’s permit only if she granted the city land for a 
public greenway to minimize flooding, as well as for a pedestrian plan de-
signed to relieve traffic congestion.57 The Court in Dolan held that in addition 
to the nexus relationship required by Nollan, the government may not condi-
tion a permit on certain requirements unless those requirements have a “rough 
proportionality” to the proposed development’s impact.58 The Court held that 
to meet this rough proportionality test, “the city must make some sort of indi-
vidualized determination” that the city’s condition “is related both in nature 
and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”59 The Court found that 
the city’s requirements lacked the necessary rough proportionality between the 
required conditions and Dolan’s proposed building.60 
In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., the Supreme Court synthesized Nollan 
and Dolan and noted that “[i]n each case, the Court began with the premise 
that, had the government simply appropriated the easement in question, this 
would have been a per se physical taking.”61 Several federal Court of Appeals 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Id. at 828. 
 51 Brief for Appellee at 4, Nollan, 483 U.S. 825 (No. 86-133). 
 52 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828. 
 53 See id. at 837, 842. 
 54 See id. at 837, 842 (“[I]f [the Commission] wants an easement across the Nollans’ property, it 
must pay for it.”). 
 55 512 U.S. 374, 377 (1994). 
 56 Id. at 379. 
 57 Id. at 380, 380 n.2, 382. 
 58 See id. at 391. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See id. at 394–95. 
 61 544 U.S. 528, 546 (2005). In Lingle, the Court clarified precedent and concluded, “whether a 
regulation ‘substantially advances’ a legitimate state interest is not a constitutional test for the purpos-
es of the Takings Clause . . . .” Sullivan, supra note 43; see Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548. 
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cases have considered the question of monetary exactions and determined that 
they fall under the purview of Penn Central rather than Nollan and Dolan.62 In 
2008, the Ninth Circuit addressed the question in McLung v. City of Sumner.63 
In McLung, the plaintiffs protested a city requirement mandating the use of a 
certain size of storm pipe.64 The McLungs claimed that the requirement consti-
tuted a monetary exaction that failed to meet the Nollan and Dolan standards.65 
The McLungs characterized the city requirement as a monetary exaction be-
cause they were forced to pay to have their storm pipes upgraded as a result of 
the regulation.66 The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument and noted, “Even if 
the upgrade could be viewed as a monetary exaction for the cost of upgrading 
the storm pipe, however, Nollan/Dolan still would not apply. A monetary exac-
tion differs from a land exaction— ‘[u]nlike real or personal property, money 
is fungible.’”67 Although the Ninth Circuit did not expand on its reasoning, the 
court restricted the Nollan/Dolan analysis to real property.68 
III. ANALYSIS 
 In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, the U.S. Su-
preme Court considered the applicability of Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard to monetary exactions.69 The Court 
ultimately concluded that exaction of fees must be considered under the Nollan 
“nexus” test along with the Dolan “rough proportionality” requirement to de-
termine whether a taking occurred in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution.70 
The Court determined that it was irrelevant that no property or funds were 
actually taken by the St. Johns River Management District (“the District”).71 
According to the Court, it is not the actual taking of property that violates the 
                                                                                                                           
 62 See, e.g., Meade v. City of Cotati, 389 F. App’x 637, 638–39 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A generally 
applicable development fee is not an adjudicative land-use exaction subject to the . . . tests of [Nollan] 
and [Dolan]. Instead, the proper framework for analyzing whether such a fee constitutes a taking is the 
fact-specific inquiry developed by the Supreme Court in [Penn Central].”); McClung v. City of 
Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2008); Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1578 (10th 
Cir. 1995) (“Based on a close reading of Nollan and Dolan, we conclude that those cases (and the tests 
outlined therein) are limited to the context of development exactions where there is a physical taking 
. . . .”). 
 63 548 F.3d at 1228. 
 64 Id. at 1222. 
 65 See id. at 1228. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. (quoting United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 n.9 (1989)). 
 68 See id. The court devoted only one paragraph of its opinion to analyzing this specific issue, 
which was one of “several arguments” advanced by the plaintiffs. Id. 
 69 See 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2603 (2013). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 2596. 
562 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 41:555 
Takings Clause in land-use permitting, but rather the government’s actions 
which “impermissibly burden the right not to have property taken without just 
compensation.”72 A government, therefore, cannot evade the Nollan and Dolan 
requirements simply by demanding property as a condition precedent for per-
mit approval, rather than as a condition subsequent.73 
The Court next considered the difference between a government condi-
tioning permit approval on asking an applicant to spend money versus requir-
ing the applicant to relinquish real property.74 The Florida Supreme Court held 
that there was no taking because one of the District’s proposed alternatives for 
Koontz was a monetary expenditure “rather than a more tangible interest in 
real property.”75 In rejecting the Florida court’s finding, the U.S. Supreme 
Court noted that if requiring a payment could never be an impermissible exac-
tion, governments might be able to circumvent constitutional barriers by re-
quiring large sums of money in exchange for land-use permits, yet avoid Nol-
lan and Dolan scrutiny.76 
The key to the Court’s analysis is that the “monetary exactions” by the 
District in Koontz unconstitutionally burdened the applicant’s property right.77 
The Court determined that the connection between the monetary condition and 
the property in question was a “direct link” sufficient to implicate a constitu-
tional right, and should be tested under the land-use-permitting context of the 
Nollan and Dolan standards.78 
The Court’s conclusion in Koontz unwisely expanded the intended scope 
of Nollan and Dolan.79 The Nollan/Dolan decisions apply in the specific con-
text of land-use permitting in which the government impermissibly condi-
tioned a permit on the surrender of an interest in real property.80 The Koontz 
                                                                                                                           
 72 Id. at 2595. 
 73 Id. The Court explained that it is irrelevant whether the permit was approved or denied. Id. at 
2595. The nexus and proportionality requirements apply equally when, as was the case in Koontz, the 
government denies a permit because the applicant refused to relinquish property. Id. 
 74 Id. at 2598. 
 75 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599. 
 76 See id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 2600 (“Because of that direct link, this case implicates the central concern of Nollan and 
Dolan: the risk that the government may use its substantial power and discretion in land-use permit-
ting to pursue governmental ends that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to the effects 
of the proposed new use of the specific property at issue, thereby diminishing without justification the 
value of the property.”). 
 79 See id. at 2603; Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005); see also Brief for 
Respondent at 24, Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (No. 11-1447). 
 80 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547. 
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decision might also have a negative effect on the environment by limiting the 
number of tools available to regulatory bodies.81 
The imposition of conditions found impermissible in Nollan and Dolan is 
hardly analogous to the proposal of conditions in Koontz.82 Finding Koontz’s 
original offset proposal unsatisfactory, the District suggested alternatives that 
would meet its mitigation standards.83 It was only when Koontz rejected the 
proposed conditions and failed to offer acceptable alternatives that the District 
denied his petition.84 
This situation contrasts with the facts of Dolan.85 In Dolan, the applicant 
challenged a city code that specifically laid out mitigation requirements for 
new developments, such as those of the petitioner.86 The city planning board 
granted the applicant’s permit subject to the city code’s conditions.87 In con-
trast, Koontz rejected both of the possibilities suggested by the District and 
subsequently declined to propose any alternatives.88 
Similarly, in Nollan the permit application was approved, but subject to a 
condition imposed by the city commission.89 When the applicants were noti-
fied about the condition to their permit, they protested its imposition but lost 
the appeal, and the permit was granted subject to the condition.90 The Nollans 
were not given the opportunity to present alternative offsets or choose from 
different mitigation options.91 In both Nollan and Dolan, the petitioners had 
mitigation conditions attached to approval of their permits without any sort of 
bargaining or choice.92 Koontz not only had two options to choose from, but 
these were merely suggestions, and the District was receptive to alternative 
proposals.93 
                                                                                                                           
 81 See Jeremy P. Jacobs, Takings Decision Confounds Experts, Spurs Accusations of Judicial 
Activism, GREENWIRE (June 26, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059983522, available at 
http://perma.cc/U3VQ-6JFB. 
 82 See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593; Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379 (1994); Nollan v. 
Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987). 
 83 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593. 
 84 Id.; Brief for Respondent, supra note 79, at 38. 
 85 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379. 
 86 Id. at 379 (“Where landfill and/or development is allowed within and adjacent to the 100-year 
floodplain, the City shall require the dedication of sufficient open land area for greenway adjoining 
and within the floodplain.”). 
 87 Id. at 379–80. 
 88 See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593; Brief for Respondent, supra note 79, at 38. 
 89 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828. 
 90 Id. (“The Nollans protested imposition of the condition, but the Commission overruled their 
objections and granted the permit subject to their recordation of a deed restriction granting the ease-
ment.”). 
 91 See id. 
 92 See id.; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379. 
 93 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593. 
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In cases such as Koontz, the governmental body in question is admittedly 
burdening the applicant’s property interest when it conditions use of that prop-
erty (specifically, approval of a permit) on a monetary expenditure.94 This does 
not necessarily move the Court’s analysis from the Penn Central test, however, 
which protects generally against excessive governmental regulation of proper-
ty, to the more specific Nollan/Dolan framework.95 Nollan and Dolan have 
been limited to the “the special context of land-use exactions.”96 
As the Supreme Court stated in Lingle, Nollan and Dolan rest on the 
premise that “had the government simply appropriated” the property interests 
subject to the contested conditions, it “would have been a per se physical tak-
ing.”97 Starting with that premise, it does not seem that the condition imposed 
in Koontz falls under the purview of the Nollan/Dolan test.98 If Koontz had 
accepted the District’s second mitigation proposal, the government would only 
have taken Koontz’s money, not any interest in real property.99 As the Supreme 
Court has stated, “[u]nlike real or personal property, money is fungible.”100 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed in McClung, noted the 
difference between money and real property, and concluded that a monetary 
obligation did not fit in the context of Nollan and Dolan.101 This does not mean 
that the exaction in Koontz is not a taking; the exaction’s constitutionality 
should simply be tested under the Penn Central standards rather than the spe-
cific lens of Nollan/Dolan.102 
In applying the Nollan/Dolan standards to monetary expenditure condi-
tions, the majority created potential practical ramifications on the local gov-
ernment level.103 First, as the dissent suggested, the holding in Koontz might 
apply to a wide array of monetary payments besides land use exactions such as 
                                                                                                                           
 94 See id. at 2596. 
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the one at issue in the case.104 It remains to be seen how widely the Koontz 
decision will be applied to government imposed fees relating to property us-
age.105 
The Court’s decision could also have a chilling effect on local land use 
permits and negative ramifications on the environment.106 Koontz has a poten-
tial to make local officials overly cautious in approving and denying per-
mits.107 The legally safe route for dealing with development applications might 
become an outright denial rather than an attempt to condition appropriate miti-
gation.108 Proposing alternative options for applicants, or negotiating proposals 
with them, could run the risk of exposing small communities across the coun-
try to costly litigation.109 
The perverse incentive created by the extension of Nollan and Dolan to 
monetary exactions could cause local governments to reject development pro-
posals and thereby dry up income badly needed to combat environmental dam-
age.110 Mitigation actions by landowners have a potential to help communities 
protect the environment while sustaining growth.111 Rather than attempt to 
compromise, local land-use regulators might be left with two options: deny 
developments and the valuable mitigation resources that might come with 
them, or approve environmentally harmful developments without the imposi-
tion of any sort of conditions.112 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Koontz v. St. John’s River Water 
Management District extends the scope of the Nollan/Dolan test to monetary 
expenditure conditions on land-use permits. Until the dust settles on Koontz, it 
is unclear what practical impact the decision will have. Ultimately, broadening 
the Nollan/Dolan protections might have a chilling effect on local land use 
permit approval and could have negative ramifications on environmental regu-
lation by limiting the tools available to local regulatory bodies. 
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